PLATO ON THE GRAMMAR OF PERCEIVING

> Let intellectual tubes give thee a glance of things which visive organs reach not.
>
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ΣΩ. ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθοτέρα ᾧ ὁρῶμεν τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ δι' οὗ ὁρῶμεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀκούομεν ὦτα, ἢ δι' οὗ ἀκούομεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. δι' ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς.
SOC. Which reply is the more correct, that eyes are what we see with or that they are what we see through? That ears are what we hear with or what we hear through?
THEAET. I think, Socrates, they are what we perceive things through rather than with.
(*Theaetetus* 184 c)

The question contrasts two ways of expressing the role of the sense organ in perception. In one the expression referring to the sense organ is put into the dative case (let us call this the 'with' idiom); the other is a construction with the preposition διά ('through') governing the genitive case of the word for the sense organ (let us call this the 'through' idiom). The virtue which the dialogue will claim for the 'through' idiom is that it reveals or emphasizes, while the 'with' idiom obscures, the unity of the perceiving consciousness, and it is in part through this contrast of idiom that Plato presents, and we have to understand, his conception of that unity. Our task is to find an interpretation of Plato's grammatical claim that will suit his philosophical purposes: one that will help to give content to the idea of the unity of the perceiving consciousness and thereby get the argument of this section of the dialogue off to a satisfactory start.[1]

I

The subject being grammar, we naturally turn first to the grammarians.[2] They say that Plato uses the 'with' idiom to express a view of eyes and ears as means by which we see and hear, and the 'through' idiom to contrast with this his own

[1] The problem was first brought to my notice by Bernard Williams, in a lecture on the *Theaetetus* given in 1964. I owe much to discussion of the dialogue with him since then. The paper was substantially completed, with the help of criticism at meetings in London, Oxford, and Princeton, before the appearance of John McDowell, *Plato Theaetetus* (Oxford 1973); it was a pleasure to find some of the interpretations I had argued for in his commentary, and at appropriate intervals I have noted significant points of agreement and disagreement. A penultimate draft benefited from discussion at the 'B Club' in Cambridge. I am also indebted to John Cooper's fine essay, 'Plato on Sense-Perception and Knowledge: *Theaetetus* 184–186', *Phronesis* 15 (1970) –his compelling critique of the interpretations of Cornford and Cherniss I propose to take as read–and to an unpublished paper by Michael Frede, 'Some Observations on Remarks about Perception in Plato's Later Dialogues', presented at the Princeton Colloquium in 1973. Finally, to my tenure of a Radcliffe Fellowship I owe the leisure which enabled me to prepare the final version; I would like to acknowledge the generosity of the Radcliffe Trustees and of University College London, who together made it possible for me to enjoy the Fellowship.

[2] I use this collective designation to refer to the following: Kühner-Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*[4] (Hanover 1955), § 434; Schwyzer-Debrunner, *Griechische Grammatik* ii (Munich 1950), 450–2; Jean Humbert, *Syntaxe Grecque*[2] (Paris 1954), § 513.

view that the sense organs are intermediaries between us and the world we perceive; to which two authorities add the qualification that the 'through' idiom as it is used here is an application or extension of the basic spatial meaning of the preposition διά.[3] The importance of this qualification will become clear in due course. It is necessary to take issue with the grammarians' elucidation of the 'with' idiom in terms of means before we can understand the 'through' idiom and the contrast it is intended to bring to our notice.

To begin, then, with the 'with' idiom, the language Plato wants to reject. What he is rejecting is represented graphically by the wooden horse model in 184 d, where Socrates endorses Theaetetus' preference for the 'through' idiom by saying:

> You are right, my lad. It is a strange state of affairs indeed if a number of senses[4] are ensconced in us, as though we were wooden horses, and they do not all converge to a single kind of thing,[5] the soul or whatever it should be called, with which we perceive through the senses as equipment [*organa*][6] such things as are perceptible.

In these lines the 'with' idiom is associated with the strange, not to say frightening,[7] thought that there are a number of senses in us or in our bodies only in the same sort of way as there were a number of Greek warriors lurking in the Trojan horse. As a scholiast remarks[8]—and I am not aware of any modern commentator who has put the point as forcibly—the message of the model is that the horse is insensate; the power of perception belongs exclusively to the warriors within. The warriors, that is to say the senses, carry on their perceptual activity in such a way that neither the horse itself nor any part of it can be credited with the perceiving that takes place inside its hulk.

The first point to notice is how reminiscent this is of the way perception had

[3] Schwyzer-Debrunner and Humbert. By contrast, Kühner-Gerth puts our case under the heading (? group of senses) 'causal and figurative' in contra-distinction to the spatial uses of διά; cp. also Goodwin, *A Greek Grammar*[2] (London 1894), § 1206. Elsewhere, Kühner-Gerth writes of the 'through' idiom as giving more definite expression to the relation of means than the 'with' idiom, though this is said without reference to the Plato example (§ 425, p. 436).

[4] So F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London 1935), 103, translates αἰσθήσεις at 184 d 2, as against Lewis Campbell's 'perceptions' in *The Theaetetus of Plato*[2] (Oxford 1883), 158, and Auguste Diès' 'sensations' in the Budé edition of the dialogue (Paris 1924), 220; Cooper, op. cit., 127, also reads 'sensations' in d 2, but McDowell, op. cit., 66, has 'senses'. Cornford is right because αἰσθήσεις is the antecedent of τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων at 184 d 4 and in the sequel it is senses, not perceptions or sensations, that are treated as ὄργανα and said to be that through which we perceive.

[5] μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν is used quite non-committally (Campbell, ad loc.: 'in the concrete vernacular sense'), as at 203 c 5–6, where it expresses the notion that a syllable is a unitary kind of thing arising from the combination of its letters.

[6] This term is variously translated 'instruments', 'implements', or 'tools', but all these, I think, are rather too concrete in their associations. I have preferred the less specific term 'equipment' as being more in keeping with the fact that Plato does not specify any particular kind or type of *organa* as what he has in mind. There are plenty of examples of non-concrete *organa*, and in a number of cases the word denotes a device for some kind of cognition: Gorgias frag. B 11a, 30 Diels-Kranz, Pl. *Rep.* 518 c, 582 d, *Phdr.* 250 b, *Crat.* 388 b c, *Soph.* 235 b, [Pl.] *De justo* 373 a, Ar. *Top.* 108 b 32, 163 b 11.

[7] It would be perfectly apt, philosophically, for δεινόν (184 d 1) to mean 'terrible' rather than or as much as 'strange' (the standard translation), since the envisaged state of affairs deprives the self of percipience.

[8] W. C. Green, *Scholia Platonica* (Haverford 1938), 440–1.

been treated earlier in the dialogue.[9] In the Heraclitean world elaborated out of Theaetetus' definition of knowledge as perception what we normally think of as the perceiving subject was deprived of all unity, synchronic as well as diachronic. In that world not only is there no identity through time, since the perceiver we call Socrates at one moment is distinct from the perceiver we call Socrates at any other moment (156 a–157 c, 158 e ff, 166 b), but even of two perceptions occurring at the same time it cannot really be said that they belong to the same perceiver. If Socrates takes a drink of wine with his eye on the contents of his cup, the Heraclitean account of this will ascribe the seeing something white to an eye and the tasting something sweet to a tongue (156 de, 159 cd), where eye and tongue are distinct perceiving things and no less distinct are the white and the sweet things they respectively perceive. We may indeed speak of Socrates tasting sweet wine, but only on the understanding that this Socrates cannot be the subject, just as the wine cannot be the object, of any other perception (159 e–160 b). There is no more to this Socrates than his tasting tongue,[10] and no more to that than is given by the statement that it is tasting this sweet wine now; so if, similarly, Socrates is to be identified with his eye when he sees something white, it follows that the Socrates who tastes something sweet at a certain moment is distinct from the Socrates who sees something white at that moment.

A parenthesis may be of value here to anyone who finds it hard to stomach the tasting tongues and seeing eyes in which Heraclitean theory deals. In *The Problems of Philosophy* Russell argues

> When I look at my table and see a certain brown colour, what is quite certain at once is not '*I* am seeing a brown colour', but rather, 'a brown colour is being seen'. This of course involves something (or somebody) which (or who) sees the brown colour; but it does not of itself involve that more or less permanent person whom we call 'I'. So far as immediate certainty goes, it might be that the something which sees the brown colour is quite momentary, and not the same as the something which has some different experience the next moment.[11]

Russell's something or somebody, which does the seeing when I look at my table but is not necessarily me, is a twentieth-century relative of Plato's seeing eye, born of a similar quest for certainty, and when one thinks it through, not much less grotesque.

Plato is more radical than Russell, however, in that his reduced view of the perceiving subject does not even allow for a number of perceptions to be gathered together into a unitary mind by some form of logical construction. When at 157 bc Plato sketches a conception of things like men and stones as collections (*ἀθροίσματα*) of perceptions or appearances, he does so not, as some commen-

[9] The connection has indeed been noticed by a number of scholars, but they have disagreed as to its significance and none, I think, has fully exploited it in their interpretation of the passage that concerns us. Cf. e.g. Cornford, op. cit., 105 (criticized below), Kenneth M. Sayre, *Plato's Analytic Method* (Chicago-London 1969), 95 ff., Cooper, op. cit., 127. The connection was noticed in ancient times too, for in Diogenes Laertius' *Life of Protagoras* we read that Protagoras 'held the soul to be nothing over and above the senses [or: perceptions], as Plato says in the *Theaetetus*' (D.L. 9.51). Since Plato does not in so many words ascribe this view to Protagoras, someone has done some (intelligent) interpretation.

[10] It is revealing, the way 159 de switches indifferently from tongue to Socrates as the subject of perception.

[11] Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford 1912), 19; cf. 51.

tators seem to think,[12] to incorporate it into the Heraclitean theory—thereby anticipating in some measure Berkeley, Hume, or Russell—but in order to rule that collections are no more immune from flux and relativity than anything else. It is people in general who say of such collections, 'This is a man, that is a stone' (or perhaps, 'I am a man, that is a stone'), not the theorists who would banish being from our speech.[13] They confine themselves to saying that one should speak in the same way about collections as about individual items (157 b 8–9), viz. in the Heraclitean-Protagorean vocabulary of their theory. They will not countenance the notion that a man or a stone *is* anything in its own right even when considered as a collection of perceptions or appearances, and this must apply whether we want to make Socrates a series of perceptions occurring at different times and places or try to equate him with what Russell calls a 'perspective', the sum of perceptions of various objects occurring at a particular place at a given time.[14] In either case all we find is those momentary seeing eyes and tasting tongues and other fleeting organs of sense, each of them individuated *wholly* in relation to the equally transient object of its perceptual activity (156 e–157 b, 159 e–160 c). The most that is conceded to the ordinary man's view of himself and his world is that collections of perceptions and collections of perceptual qualities may occur (come into being and pass away) in relation to one another, where by 'collection' is meant a mere collocation of distinct items whose togetherness is an arbitrary imposition of ordinary language,[15] not the constituting of a unified entity such that one could properly say of an appearance or a perception that it belongs to that stone or to this man. The very words 'this' and 'that', and likewise the words I would need to say that an organ or its perception was mine or somebody else's, are banned as checking the natural flow of things; insofar as 'mine' or 'somebody's' imply that I and the somebody are things in our own right, apart from our perception of the moment, they have no place in a strict Heraclitean language (157 b).[16]

[12] e.g. Sayre, op. cit., 78, n. 24, and, with reservations, I. M. Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines* (London-New York 1962–3), ii.19–20.

[13] As Campbell notes, op. cit., 62, the subject of τίθενται at 157 c 1 is indefinite (i.e. it is not οἱ σοφοί from 157 b 3–4), and it is translated accordingly by Diès, Cornford, and McDowell.

[14] The reference is to Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Mind* (London-New York 1921), 105.

[15] In the context the passive ἀθροισθέντων (157 b 9) may invite the question 'By whom/what were the collections gathered?', and the answer 'By men, in connection with name-giving'. This is not certain, but it is quite in the spirit of the Heraclitean theory to hint that ordinary language classifications like 'man' and 'stone' are man-made, not a recognition of items found existing independently in the world.

[16] This is assuming that we keep οὔτε του οὔτ' ἐμοῦ at 157 b 4, a phrase that has been felt to require emendation. Of the proposals recorded by Burnet, Hirschig's σοῦ οὔτ' ἐμοῦ would not affect the interpretation of the point and Schanz's τοῦτο is rejected by R. Hackforth, 'Notes on Plato's Theaetetus', *Mnemosyne* Series 4, 10 (1957), 131, on the good grounds that it is unlikely to have been corrupted into the reading the manuscripts now offer. He himself proposes οὔτε τὸ οὐδαμοῦ, a prohibition of the definite article τό, by analogy with the Buttmann-Cornford emendation of 202 a 4 and 205 c 8, arguing that possessives do not imply the fixity which a Heraclitean wants to delete and are indeed part of the apparatus set out at 160 b 8 –10 (cf. 160 c 7–8) for expressing the relativity of everything. To this it may be replied: (a) the emendations on which Hackforth relies for his analogy are themselves gratuitous (cf. Campbell, op. cit., 213–14 and M.F. Burnyeat, 'The Material and Sources of Plato's Dream', *Phronesis* 15, 1970, 120; and on Cornford's parallel emendation of *Soph.* 239 a 3, to which Hackforth also refers, cf. Michael Frede, 'Bemerkungen zum Text der Aporienpassage in Platons Sophistes', *Phronesis* 7, 1962, 132–3); (b) already in 157 b Socrates confesses that he cannot always speak

It is true that the wooden horse model is not Heraclitean. The hypothesis of constant change through time having been safely refuted, the organs and objects dealt with in our section of the dialogue are the ordinary stable kind which continue in being from one moment to the next. But the wooden horse with its warrior-senses is a fair representation of what remains of the earlier picture if flux through time is subtracted from it. Each organ or sense being an autonomous perceiving subject, the only role left to Socrates, if he is not to be identified with his eye when he is seeing and with his tongue when he is tasting, is that of a mere container, like the hollow horse, for the real subjects of these processes.

This may suggest that we should read the 'with' idiom as picking out the subject of perception, rather than the means used by a separate subject as the grammarians suppose. And the suggestion is duly confirmed when Plato denies that we perceive with eyes and ears only to affirm that we perceive with something else, the soul (184 d 4, 7, 185 d 3). The soul, that with which we perceive, he calls the perceiving (*sc.* part) of ourselves (185 c 8),[17] the perceiving subject which sees and hears through the appropriate organs or senses (185 e 6–7, 186 b 2–3, etc.). If what Plato is affirming is that there is just one subject in perception –and one reason why he has Socrates at first affect indifference about whether or not we call this one thing the soul (184 d 3) may be to point up that its singleness is what he is interested in–then what he is denying must be that there are many perceivers, that the organs themselves are what do the perceiving. Since, moreover, he is going to argue for this denial, another reason for the curious delicacy about naming the soul may be that he does not wish the notion of the soul prematurely to import, or seem to import, the unity he needs to establish.[18]

Evidently, the working rule for the 'with' idiom is this: to say that a man ϕs with x is to say that x is that part of him (in the thinnest possible sense of 'part') which ϕs when he does, that in him which does his ϕing or by ϕing makes it the case that he ϕs. The idiom is the one used to formulate the famous question at *Republic* 436 a as to whether it is with the same (*sc.* part) of ourselves, viz. with the whole soul, or with different ones in each case that we learn, grow indignant and crave the lower pleasures. There too Plato treats the 'parts' of the soul with which we do such things as themselves the subjects or agents doing them: when, for example, with one part of his soul a man wants to drink and with another

to the strictest Heraclitean standards; (c) in any case, what the Heraclitean wishes to avoid is the implication, which would (*pace* Hackforth) normally attach to the use of 'mine', that I am something in my own right, apart from my perception of the moment, and since 160 ac is explaining precisely that this is not so, the context effectively cancels any misleading implications that Socrates' use of possessives might otherwise have–we need not quibble about the text or the logic of the ban put on possessives earlier at 157 b.

[17] It is, I think, fair to use this piece of evidence, even though it comes from a rhetorical question–through what equipment does the perceiving part of ourselves perceive being and other common features?–asked with a view to establishing that such features are not perceived through any equipment, not indeed perceived at all but grasped in thought. However rhetorical, the question presupposes that if they were perceived the soul would be the perceiving part that discovered them. (Failure to sense the rhetorical nature of the question leads William Bondeson, 'Perception, True Opinion and Knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus', *Phronesis* 14, 1969, 111–12, to worry about an ambiguity in 'perceives' here.)

[18] Cf. *Crito* 47 de, where Socrates similarly refrains from saying what it is in us that justice benefits and injustice harms; on that occasion his motive for not naming the soul is probably to avoid argument, not to prepare for it. Also *Symp.* 218 a.

part wants not to, this means that one part is urging him on to drink and the other is holding him back (439 c). The soul in conflict is compared to an archer drawing a bow: one hand thrusts it away, the other pulls it towards him (439 b).

What Plato is rejecting, then, is the view that the senses have the kind of autonomy that the parts of the divided soul have in the *Republic*. No doubt the 'with' idiom as ordinarily used *need* not convey so strong a sense of autonomy. One would not build a theory of independent perceiving subjects on the instrumental dative in passing phrases like 'He looked at me with his eyes' (*Charm.* 155 cd: ἐνέβλεψέν τέ μοι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς).[19] Nor, again, is it inevitable that trouble arise from the syntactic transformation, available in English as well as Greek, which promotes an instrumental expression to the position of subject of the verb ('He looked at me with his eyes' → 'His eyes looked at me').[20] But given a suitable background of argument and theory, grammatical moves of this sort can encourage a philosophically misleading picture, and in the context of the *Republic's* discussion of the divided soul the working rule I formulated earlier does, I think, help support a greater autonomy for the individual parts than grammar alone should license. It is in fact worth pursuing the comparison with the *Republic* a little further, since there are places in Books vii and x of that work where the senses come into conflict with a higher faculty and emerge with something of the same autonomy in the cognitive sphere as the products of tripartition have in the motivation of action.

As the *Republic* views the matter, the proof and expression of autonomy is conflict: one part of the soul is seen to act independently of another when we find opposed strivings in the same person and have to assign them to distinct subjects or agencies within him in order to avoid the contradiction of the same subject admitting contrary predicates. The same rules govern the field of perception. In Book x (602 c–603 a) Plato explains such phenomena as the stick in water continuing to look crooked even when we know it to be straight, by distinguishing a part of the soul that judges (meaning, though he does not so express it, with which we judge) the shape and size of objects by the results of measurement and a part that goes by appearances. The reason he has to divide the soul here is that he takes the stick's appearing crooked to imply a judgement by the perceiver that it is crooked, a judgement which, being contrary to the verdict reached by measurement, must represent the opinion of an inferior part of the soul. Seeing is not the only function of this part of the soul—the context is a discussion of art and, having served to explain the magical effects of painting, this same part turns up again as the self-indulgently emotional part to which tragedy appeals (605 ac), and it is presumably not to be distinguished, either, from the low clown in us which comedy excites (606 cd). But Plato's view in Book x is that we can be set against ourselves in innumerable ways (603 d), and in making his divisions he is clearly less interested in the precise identity of these various opponents of reason than in describing the disturbances they create in the soul. So it is probably a mistake to try to fit them or perception in particular into the

[19] Likewise e.g. *Phaedo* 79 a, Xen.*Symp.* 4.58. But the dative construction can be extended to independent agents used by a subject, as at Xen. *Cyr.* 4.3.21, Eur. *Heracl.* 392.

[20] Cf. John Lyons, *Structural Semantics—an analysis of part of the vocabulary of Plato* (Oxford 1963), 158, and for the English analogue, Dennis W. Stampe, 'Towards a Grammar of Meaning', *Phil.Rev.* 77 (1968), 156 ff.

the earlier tripartite scheme.[21] In more senses than one, reason is the only constant. What matters for present purposes is that Plato is prepared to speak of a distinguishable part with perception as one, at least, of its functions, and that this part can deliver judgements at variance with those of reason.[22]

The other noteworthy passage is the disquisition in Book vii (523 a–525 a) on the philosophical benefits of contemplating one's fingers. The senses are said to signify or report what it is they perceive to the soul, and the soul, finding some of their deliverances absurd—as, for example, when sight announces that one and the same finger is both large and small—has then to summon thought and reasoning to work out the true nature of the situation. There is no talk here of different parts of the soul, but the senses have a considerable autonomy, not only in that they do the perceiving, but also as constituting an independent source of judgements. In both passages it is as judgement-maker that sense comes into conflict with reason and shows its independence.

But it is not only in the *Republic* that some power of judgement is reckoned in with the perceptual activity of the senses. Earlier in the *Theaetetus* perception is treated as including or being accompanied by sufficient thought on the part of the perceiver to identify its objects. Sometimes (e.g. 161 d, 179 c) perception and judgement are mentioned separately, more often the presence of judgemental factors is conveniently disguised in the notion of something's appearing to one, which, as Plato points out in the *Sophist* (264 b), is really an amalgam of perception and judgement. Now there is nothing to be wondered at in this, nothing that would not find a parallel in, say, Berkeley; a certain fuzziness about the role of judgement in perception seems to be inherent in the empiricist approach, and the issue is central to Kant's critique of empiricism. So also with Plato's critique of the views, recognizably of an empiricist character, which he elaborates out of Theaetetus' definition of knowledge as perception. In the passage that concerns us he is going to take the definition to task for helping itself to the notion of judgement in a way that evades the crucial matter of what perception

[21] It is striking, but not, I think, indicative of any firm view on Plato's part, that it is his eyes that Leontius rebukes for desiring to look upon the corpses (440 a). Terry Penner, 'Thought and Desire in Plato', in Gregory Vlastos (ed.), *Plato II: Ethics, Politics and Philosophy of Art and Religion* (New York 1971), 100–1, roundly equates the perceiving part with the irrational part (he thinks there is really only one) which opposes reason in Book iv, but that is because the very considerations that militate against a neat location within the tripartite scheme for Book x's irrational part(s)—e.g. the fact that the clown at least combines features from both spirit and appetite (cf. 606 d 1–2)—he uses to impugn the reality of Plato's division of spirit from appetite. A.J.P. Kenny, 'Mental Health in Plato's Republic', *Proc. Brit. Acad.* 55 (1969), 248–9, suggests that the perceiving part is a subdivision within reason itself, apparently overlooking its later alignment with the irrational part which tragedy encourages against reason and which Kenny himself is sensibly disinclined to identify with any of the parts met with elsewhere.

[22] James Adam, *The Republic of Plato* (Cambridge 1902), ii.406, in an otherwise judicious note on the relation between the psychology of Book x and the tripartite soul, wrongly claims that it is a new development for the irrational part to be assigned a capacity for forming opinions. To mention just three pieces of contrary evidence: (a) the virtue of courage requires spirit to understand and hold fast to the conception of what is not to be feared which reason lays down for it (442 bc; cf. 429 bc); (b) in a temperate soul all three parts agree (442 d 1: ὁμοδοξῶσι) that reason should rule; (c) the tyrant lets opinions about right and wrong which others entertain only, if at all, in their dreams, run rampant in his waking life (574 d). In general, it is as mistaken to suppose the lower two parts of the soul incapable of thought or judgement as it is to deny desires and pleasures to the top part.

on its own can achieve. How can perception grasp what is, so as to yield knowledge, if even to think the thought that a thing is is to do something that cannot be accounted for as the exercise of a sense faculty? Take away judgement and all that is left to perception is to be an unarticulated encounter with sensible things.

But this is to anticipate. I have been pointing out first, that when Plato corrects the *Republic's* habit of speaking about the senses as if they were autonomous subjects perceiving and judging things on their own, he also, and perhaps chiefly, has a more immediate target within the dialogue; and second, that a major issue in the dispute over idioms, in relation both to the *Republic* and to the earlier parts of the *Theaetetus*, is the role of judgement.[23] Socrates begins the *Theaetetus* discussion by making clear that he does not believe in verbal niceties for their own sake (184 c). If he feels the need to correct a misleading form of expression, it is for a reason, and an important part of the reason is that he is going to distinguish perception and judgement in a way that effectively denies to the senses the judgemental function they had in the *Republic* and earlier in the *Theaetetus*. Autonomy in a perceiving subject presupposes judgement (conceptualization, consciousness) brought to bear by the subject on the objects of sense—on this important point Plato is surely right—so the rejection of idioms which endow the senses with cognitive powers of their own and the separation of judgement from perception are two linked aspects of the same enterprise. Keeping this in mind, let us return to grammar.

II

What I hope to have established so far is that the question 'Do we perceive with the several sense organs or with just one thing, the soul?' is the question 'What is the proper subject of our various perceptions, the individual organs involved or always one and the same soul?', where the 'or' carries its exclusive sense. Socrates proposes a single perceiving subject in place of, not in addition to, the seeing eyes and tasting tongues of the earlier discussion. The unity thesis is not, therefore, a mere supplement to the Heraclitean theory of perception, as Cornford supposes when he writes, 'That account stands; but it is now added that, behind the separate organs, there must be a mind, centrally receiving their several reports.'[24] That account does not stand, though this is not the place to argue the issue, but if it did it could not survive the passage we are considering. As we noticed, the Heraclitean theory does not simply omit to provide for a central mind—it excludes the possibility of such a thing, by reducing the perceiving subject to that which is here and now perceiving a momentary object such as this sweet wine.[25] A theory which does not allow the same thing to appear as the

[23] Cooper, op. cit., 127, 145, notices the correction of the *Republic* but confines himself to calling the language of that dialogue a 'misleading inaccuracy'; McDowell, op. cit., 185–6, speaks of tacit criticism of the *Republic* but does not enlarge on what it consists in. On the other hand, A.J.Holland, 'An Argument in Plato's Theaetetus: 184–6', *Phil. Quart.* 23 (1973), 110–16, treats *Rep.*vii and the argument of our passage as 'stages in a single train of thought'. None of these writers brings in *Rep.*x, and in consequence they miss the point that it is on the role of judgement in perception that the *Theaetetus* departs most decisively from the *Republic*, and indeed from its own earlier assumptions.

[24] Op. cit., 105; cf. also 50, n. 1.

[25] Both Cooper, op. cit., 127, and McDowell, op. cit., 143–4, 185, although they disagree with Cornford through and through, still talk as if no more was at stake than an omission, which Plato is now repairing. The correct view is adumbrated by J. C. Dybikowski in a review in the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 3 (1973), 140.

subject of more than one perception leaves no room for a central perceiving mind, no status for Socrates as a perceiving subject apart from the tongue which is presently tasting this particular mouthful of wine.

Conversely, the first point of substance to be made about the central perceiving mind Plato is now advocating is that without loss of identity it appears as the subject of many perceptions. As Socrates puts it in terms of the 'with' idiom, he wants to be able to say that 'It is with some one and the same [*sc.* part] of ourselves that we gain access through our eyes to both[26] white things and black, and through the other sense organs to yet further things' (184 d 7–184 e 1). This statement attributes to a single perceiving subject both different acts of seeing—the seeing of things white and the seeing of things black—and perceptions involving different senses such as seeing and tasting. And it appears to comprehend both the case of one mind having a number of perceptions at the same time and the case of the same mind recurring in the perceptions of different times. At any rate, both are allowed for in what follows: to begin with, although no restriction to a single time is explicitly stated, Plato seems chiefly concerned with someone seeing and hearing at the same time (in the argument of 184 d ff), or tasting two things more or less together (185 bc), but he makes a point later of saying that an understanding of values requires comparative assessments relating past, present and future (186 a; cf. also 186 c), and this is clearly something that presupposes continuity through time of the same thinking and perceiving subject.

But now a problem arises. If there is but a single subject of consciousness, the same in all our perceptions, what role remains for the individual senses? Having overthrown the wooden horse model, we need an account of the relation between the mind and the body with its several organs. This relation is what the 'through' idiom is designed to capture. The problem is to know just what view of the relation it expresses, and how it pictures the working of the senses or sense organs.

In principle, there would seem to be as many possibilities here as there are applicable senses or uses of the preposition *διά* in construction with the genitive case. And it is not too difficult to persuade oneself that the 'through' idiom is, in fact, ambiguous, that there are two distinct senses of the Greek *διά* or the English 'through' which might be involved in the present context: (i) a spatial sense concerned (literally or figuratively) with the passage taken by a process through a space, and (ii) a causal one (in the grammarians' sense of 'causal') concerned with the means through which something is brought about, this causal sense in turn being subdivided according as the means in question is (a) an animate agent through whom one acts or (b) an inanimate thing, e.g. a piece of equipment, through which a certain result is effected. This yields three models to choose between: the senses or sense organs are like apertures in the body through which the soul perceives what goes on in the world outside; they are like subsidiary agents employed by the soul in the business of perception; they are some sort of equipment used by the soul as an aid to perception. Since, however, this last is exactly what Socrates himself indicates at 184 d 4, when he likens the senses to equipment (*organa*) through which we perceive with the soul, we seem to have Plato's own authority for taking the preposition in sense (ii)(b): causal, of inanimate means. The model Plato is proposing is that of equipment for a job.

[26] Due weight should be given to *τε καί* (184 d 8–e 1), the anti-Heraclitean import of which fails to show through Cornford's rendering 'we apprehend black or white'.

The point of the model is no doubt this, that equipment does not do a job for you—you have to use it. It may be necessary to the job as an indispensable aid, but it is not sufficient, not a substitute for your own activity. So interpreted, the model is a natural corollary to the thesis that the mind is the sole subject in perception.

We can now see why, before we could understand the 'through' idiom, it was necessary to get free of the grammarians' notion that the 'with' idiom expresses the view that the sense organs are means the perceiver uses to perceive with; for this is part of what the 'through' idiom conveys. It is only by coming to see that the 'with' idiom expresses not the idea of means, but rather that of subjecthood or even agency, that we open up a genuine contrast between the two idioms. As long as the dative involved in the 'with' idiom is classified as an 'instrumental dative', where this is something more than a conventional grammarians' label, with the result that the idea of means or instruments is already present in the rejected idiom, then only a nuance, at best, will distinguish it from the 'through' idiom, given that this too is associated with instrumentality.[27] As for the grammarians' interpretation of the 'through' idiom, according to which the sense organs are intermediaries between the soul and the world outside, the trouble is that if this has to *contrast* with the idea of means, it is likely to suggest that the sense organs are subsidiary subjects or agents in perception, who transmit perceptual information to the mind; on such a view, close to that of the *Republic*, the organs or senses will still do the perceiving, albeit on behalf of the soul, and the soul's main function in the business will be the one which Cornford describes, of 'centrally receiving their several reports'. Those grammarians who emphasize the spatial content of the 'through' idiom—and I shall be following up that lead very shortly—may have in mind a less active role for the senses. But whatever the grammarians intend, Plato's purpose clearly requires an account whereby the sense organs are not agents or subjects at all; the mind is the sole subject in perception and should reserve all responsibility to itself, leaving for the senses the role Socrates assigns to them of indispensable aids. This outcome is secured, and the contrast between the two idioms is seen to be both real and relevant, on the interpretation I have defended:[28] the 'with' idiom identifies the subject which per-

[27] 'Only a nuance' is indeed the express verdict of one of the grammarians cited earlier, Jean Humbert, in his work *La Disparition du datif en grec* (Paris 1930), 116–17. It is also what Campbell, op. cit., 158, offers when he explains the difference between the two idioms as that between direct and indirect instrumentality, a difference which is, he says, 'obvious, but difficult to render exactly'. Campbell in fact renders διά by 'through the medium of' (so too Cooper, op. cit., 127), which has much the same vagueness or spread of meaning as the plain 'through'.

[28] The interpretation itself is by no means new. My endeavour has been to give a reasoned account of the meaning and purpose of Plato's grammatical claim, thus defending an interpretation which is asserted but not explained e.g. by Constantin Ritter, *Platon* (Munich 1910–23), ii.485, and A.E. Taylor, *Plato—the Man and His Work* (London 1926), 338–9, n. 2, not to mention Philo, *De post. Caini* 126, and more recently by Cooper, op. cit., 127, McDowell, op. cit., 185–6. Most writers, having discerned more or less clearly what Plato aims to say, do not stop to indicate how the grammatical contrast enables him to say it. Definitely wrong, however, is a statement of Harold Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (Baltimore 1944), i.402, n. 327, assimilating Plato's preference for saying that one perceives with the soul through the senses to Aristotle's well-known remark (*De an.* 408^{b}13–15) that it is better to say, not that the soul feels pity, learns or thinks, but that the man does these things with his soul; as noted earlier, Plato equates the two things that Aristotle contrasts. Aristotle, I take it, is opposing the suggestion that the subject of consciousness can be anything but the man himself; a separate subject within him—

ceives in us, while the 'through' idiom describes its relation to the perceptual equipment provided by the body for the perceiver to use.

III

However, it is not so straightforward a matter as may appear to write a good dictionary entry for a preposition.[29] Notice that the equipment model occurs in the middle of a spatial metaphor: the senses converge to the soul (184 d 3–4) which gains access through the sense organs to the things we perceive with it (184 d 8–9). It is hard to resist the picture of paths through the body converging to the soul within and providing it with outlets or channels through which it can detect things external to the body. What, in that case, becomes of the idea that the 'through' idiom is ambiguous? Is there, after all, a sharp distinction to be drawn between a spatial and a causal sense of the preposition? This is where it is relevant to recall that some grammarians regard the so-called causal use of the preposition as an outgrowth of the basic spatial meaning of the word, an extension which often retains traces of its spatial origin.[30]

To take first the case of acting through another person, a good paradigm to use in this connection is speaking through an interpreter (in Greek, *δι' ἑρμηνέως λέγειν*—Xen. *An.* 2.3.17): when an interpreter says, 'I must apologize for not being able to speak English', it is not he that is apologizing—he is just on the route, so to speak, through which the apology has to pass if it is to be understood, rather as when one puts a question through the chairman of a committee. In this vein we find Herodotus writing, 'Croesus proclaimed these things through messengers' (1.69: *Κροῖσος μὲν δὴ ταῦτα δι' ἀγγέλων ἐπεκηρυκεύετο*) or 'Having sent . . . his most trustworthy men through them he saw [the body] and buried it' (1.113: *πέμψας . . . τοὺς πιστοτάτους εἰδέ τε διὰ τούτων καὶ ἔθαψε κτλ.*).[31] A similar conception of action at a distance is implied at *Theaetetus* 162 a 5–6, where Theodorus is uncomfortable at the prospect of his friend Protagoras being refuted through him, if he becomes the respondent who has to agree to Socrates' criticisms of Protagoras' philosophy (cf. also *Theaet.* 169 e 7). And Aristotle is reflecting, or reflecting on, this usage and the outlook it encourages when he says that things done through friends are in a way done through ourselves, since the cause or initiation of the action is in us (*E.N.* $1112^{b}27$–8); what he means is that when a friend does something for me, at my instigation, I can still be said to be the one

let it be as single as you like—will not do. This is essentially the criticism of Plato's final position that I come to in my last section below.

[29] The entry for *διά* in Liddell-Scott-Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford 1940), leaves much to be desired from the point of view of usefulness to an enterprise like the present one. Not only does it divide the material into senses without indicating how they overlap and link together, but it gives only two prose examples of the relevant spatial meaning and does not show how frequently *διά* plus the genitive is used to express the relation of mind and body in perception and other experiences. (I shall be illustrating the perceptual case, so let me simply note here a few examples from the case of pleasure and pain: Pl. *Phd.* 65 a 7, *Rep.*485 d 12, 584 c 4–5, *Phil.* 39 d 1–2, Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.5, 1.5.6.) By far the best picture is that given by Schwyzer-Debrunner.

[30] Etymologically, *διά* is traced to the same root as *δίς*, *δύο*, and to an original meaning 'between', as of the interval between two points (cf. German 'zwischen', 'zwei'); cf. Kühner-Gerth, §434, Humbert, *Syntaxe Grecque*, §512, also Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, trans. T.G. Rosenmeyer (Oxford 1953), 236.

[31] Cf. also Thuc. 2.2.3 (this and the two Herodotus examples are listed in Schwyzer-Debrunner under the heading 'Vom Vermittler, durch den die Tätigkeit eines andern hindurchgeht, d.h. ausgeübt wird'), Eur. *Suppl.* 40–1, Pl. *Ion* 533 c (a striking passage), *Symp.* 202 e–203 a, *Phdr.* 242 d 11–e 1, and the distinction between producing a play *ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι* and *διά τινος ἄλλου*.

who did it. Hence it is that he can liken friends, wealth, and political power to equipment (*organa*) through which one acts (1099^{a}33–^{b}2).

The other case, where something is brought about through an inanimate thing, includes some examples of philosophical interest. In the *Prior Analytics* Aristotle uses διά plus the genitive to describe terms (e.g. 42^{a}31), premisses (e.g. 53^{b}4–5, 55^{b}3–4), and figures (e.g. 27^{a}36) as things a syllogism is or occurs through. They are, each in their own way, what a proof proceeds through, so that *reductio ad absurdum* proof, for example, is called 'syllogism through the impossible' (e.g. 28^{b}14, 61^{a}19) because it proceeds through a premiss which is shown to be impossible.[32] Again, when Aristotle turns to practical thinking in the *Ethics* and wants to speak of things which help to realize an end, whether as external means to it in the narrow sense or as part of the end itself, he standardly refers to them as that through which an end is secured or, alternatively, 'things towards the end' (τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος). Translators normally understand this 'through' in a causal sense and import into their versions the English word 'means', a practice which encourages the charge that Aristotle did not properly distinguish between the notions of means to an end and constituents of an end.[33] But the alternative preposition 'towards' indicates that Aristotle's vocabulary still reflects the spatial force of 'through'; he is operating with a picture of practical thought or action as proceeding through one thing towards another in a way that can comprehend both external means and internal constituents (in eating a piece of spaghetti I make a beginning and work through the middle towards the end and consumption of the whole: my progress can be pictured in linear fashion without doing violence to the part–whole relationship).[34]

Furthermore, where the senses and their organs are concerned, spatial overtones are hardly to be wondered at. The ears, for one, are naturally treated as apertures or orifices in the body through which sounds are heard and naturally described in terms which bring out the spatial force of the preposition διά—a simple example is Plato speaking of a flute pouring music into the soul through the ears as if through a funnel (*Rep.* 411 a; cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 56, 451, Soph. *O.T.* 1386–7,[35] frag. 773 Nauck, Pl.*Phdr.* 235d, *Soph.* 234c). So too with the nose,

[32] Cf. J. Duerlinger, 'συλλογισμός and συλλογίζεσθαι in Aristotle's Organon', *Am.J. Philol.* 90 (1969), who cites these examples only to divide them, quite needlessly, into causal and compositional senses of διά; there is no necessity to distinguish senses if we take seriously the spatial meaning of the preposition Cf. also *Top.* 1.1.

[33] Cf. on this W.F.R. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (Oxford 1968), 255–7.

[34] Cf. e.g. *E.N.* 1112^{b}11–24, where the two prepositions are juxtaposed and a linear picture encouraged by the comparison with analysis in geometry; the spatial connotation of πρός comes out clearly in a phrase at *E.E.* 1227^{a}12: περὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερόντων ἡ σκέψις . . . ἐστιν. No doubt the background paradigm for the use of 'through' in connection with reasoning is the old metaphor of the path of inquiry and the common image of an intellectual journey, from which come many opportunities for the preposition to mark the steps and stages of a thinker's progress (cf. e.g. *Rep.* 511 b 8–c 2, 534 c 1–2). We may note a minor example of such a journey in the very passage we are discussing. At *Theaet.* 186 c Socrates says of certain kinds of reflection that they come to one only 'with difficulty and in time through many troubles and education' (μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας), and clearly what the troubles and education have in common is not that they are means to the goal (the troubles are, rather, obstacles), nor that they are the price you have to pay for it (this, which is Diès's translation, is not a very apt description of education), but that they are things you have to pass through to reach the goal.

[35] This Sophocles example is cited by Schwyzer-Debrunner under the heading 'vom sachlichen Mittel, als dem Weg, auf dem etwas getan wird' to illustrate the remark 'doch ist in klass. Zeit die örtliche Bedeutung noch deutlich zu verspüren'.

Plato writes of smells as perceptions which occur through the nostrils during eating (*Prot.* 334 c).[36] But it should be remembered that Greek scientific theory tended to explain all perception by the presence of pores in the body through which we receive data from the external world (Emp. frag. 3, 12 Diels–Kranz, Hipp. *Regimen* 1.35. 59 ff, Pl. *Meno* 76 c, Ar. *Gen. et Corr.* 324^{b}26 ff, Theoph. *De sensu*, 7 *et al.*), and a less directly physical view of the senses collectively as receptors for outside data to come in through turns up in the *Theaetetus* itself at 194c, when discussion of the model of the Wax Tablet leads Socrates to retail some speculations about the conditions under which the things that come through the senses get firmly imprinted on the tablet of the mind and result in reliable memory. The same spatial picture can be found when the perspective on perception is from within rather than from the outside. In the *Phaedo* (82e–83b) the embodied soul trying to get clear about the nature of things by studying them through the eyes and ears and other senses is compared to a prisoner peering out through the bars of the prison which is the body, and this in a context which also talks about the soul using the senses for the purposes of its inquiry (83 a 7; cf. 79 c, Soph. *Phil.*1013–14). Evidently, Plato feels no tension between the spatial and the instrumental language. Nor, indeed, is there any reason why he should, since an aperture can perfectly well be used as a means by anything that can use means at all. In fact, where an aperture is involved, spatial and instrumental overtones are liable to merge in a way that is quite impossible to disentangle. Two examples to illustrate this point and we can return to the *Theaetetus*.

When in a poem by Praxilla (*floruit c.*450 B.C.) a girl is addressed, 'You who look so prettily at me through the window (*διὰ τῶν θυρίδων*), a maiden in face but a bride below' (frag. 3 Diehl), is she using the window as a means or is it just a gap between the speaker and her? The question cannot be answered, any more than it is possible to decide between means and aperture when the Aristotelian *Problems* (962^{b}35 ff) wonders whether the reason why deaf people speak through their noses is that the congestion which causes their deafness prevents the sound from getting out anywhere but through the nostrils. Against this background, the conjunction of the equipment model with a spatial metaphor in the *Theatetetus* should occasion no resistance. If the 'through' idiom has spatial connotations as part, at least, of its meaning, that need not be at odds with Socrates' likening the senses to equipment. Rather, the spatial metaphor will help to specify the way in which the body provides the soul with the equipment to perceive through. It offers the means of access to things in the world around.

Although it is, strictly speaking, the senses rather than the sense organs that Socrates first compares to equipment (*organa*) and subsequently speaks of as *organa* without qualification (185 a 5, c 7; 185 d 9 is perhaps not specific), so that the word *organa* is not used here in the biological sense of 'organ',[37] he does not trouble to distinguish between two forms that the soul's access to the world through the body may take. It may go through a sense or perceptual capacity such as sight (184 d 4, 184 e 8–185 a 5, 185 b 7–8, 185 e 7, 186 b 3), but it may equally go through a sense organ, a proper part of the body (184 c 6–8, 184 d

[36] Cf. also the flowing in through the eyes of beauty and love at *Phdr.* 251 b, *Crat.* 420 b, and the coming in of sight at *Phdr.* 250 d.

[37] Elsewhere, Plato does apply the term to sense organs (*Rep.* 508 b, *Tim.* 45 ab), but it seems not yet to have acquired the generalized biological meaning it has in Aristotle.

8–184 e 1); in a couple of lines it is not specified either way (184 e 5, 185 d 3), and at 185 c 1–4 Socrates talks in hybrid fashion of examining whether two things are salty with (dative case) the perceptual capacity which operates through the tongue. Obviously, the spatial metaphor will be more concrete, more suggestive of actual pathways through the body, when the 'through' idiom is applied to the sense organs themselves rather than to the powers that operate through them, and Plato's detailed physical theories about these things in the *Timaeus* are couched in terms of processes that pass through parts of the body to arrive at the centre of consciousness (e.g. 64 ab, 67 b; cf. *Phil.* 33 d). But in the *Theaetetus* the switching back and forth between the capacities and the organs of sense implies that no more than a picture is involved. Plato makes it a principle to oppose verbal exactitude for its own sake, if nothing of philosophical substance is at issue, as he explains when he has Socrates introduce the contrast between the two idioms with an apology for what may look like a narrow-minded insistence on linguistic precision (184 c); and his reverting to the 'with' idiom at 185 c 1, once the distinction he is after has been made, is doubtless an illustration of the point. So I take it that nothing of philosophical substance, from Plato's point of view, turns on whether it is through the sense organs or through the senses that we say the soul gains access to the world.

The same goes, I think, for the question of whether to say the soul is active or passive in perception. Plato does not in so many words say either of these things,[38] but activity of some sort is suggested by the equipment model and by the use of verbs of reaching out and investigating (184 d 8: ἐφικνούμεθα, 185 b 10: σκέψασθαι, 185 e 7: ἐπισκοπεῖν), while a more passive picture is given at 186 c (cf. 184 d 3–4). There, instead of the soul gaining access to the world (as at 184 d 8), it is rather the world which gains access to the soul through the body; for perception, as much of it at least as is present in both men and beasts from the moment of birth, is said to be of such affections as reach through the body as far as the mind. I do not think Plato means to imply that what is perceived is itself (merely) a bodily affection—as we shall see, the rest of the passage supports a contrary view—but he is saying, what he says again more clearly in the *Philebus* (33 d–34 a), that perception takes place when a sensory organ is stimulated sufficiently for the process to come to the notice of the mind;[39] and on some

[38] Commentators raise the question for him, however: Crombie, op. cit. ii. 16, and Bondeson, op. cit., 113, give the passive answer, Cooper, op. cit., 127 (though cf. 131, n. 11), the active. I owe thanks to Michael Frede's advocacy of the passive view (in the paper mentioned, note 1 above) for forcing me to rethink the question and temper an earlier enthusiasm for the active conception.

[39] In order to avoid committing Socrates to 'the odd view that we perceive our experiences', McDowell, op. cit., 69, 111, proposes an unconventional translation of the clause at 186 c 1–2 ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει: '[men and animals perceive] all the things which direct experiences to the mind by means of the body', with ὅσα subject, τείνει transitive, and παθήματα object. Comparison with the *Philebus* passage, however, vindicates the more orthodox view followed above, which takes ὅσα παθήματα together as subject to τείνει intransitive and yields '[perceive] such affections as reach through the body as far as the mind'. The *Philebus* speaks of the mind not failing to notice (33 d 9: μὴ λανθάνειν), rather than perceiving (αἰσθάνεσθαι), the bodily happenings which reach it, but this hardly removes the unfortunate suggestion that the process which is supposed to explain what happens in perception itself relies on some kind of perceptual awareness by the soul, albeit possibly of inner rather than outer things; in short, perception is explained by certain occurrences in the body plus perception. I agree with McDowell, and with Crombie, op. cit. ii.26, that Plato does not in all seriousness intend to embrace the idea that

people's criteria for passivity (Berkeley's, for instance) the fact of perception being in this way caused by something other than the mind's own agency would be enough to make it an event in which the mind is simply passive. But it would be unwise to allow an uncritical acceptance, on Plato's behalf, of so limited a criterion to overrule the indications that he does also envisage an active use of the senses as equipment for gaining access to (184 d) and investigating (185 e 6–7) sensible qualities, with a view to answering such questions as whether two things both taste salty (185 bc).

True, as the argument proceeds we come to realize that no question is so simple that perception alone can answer it—the question, for example, whether something is salty imports the notion of being and so requires the soul's independent activity of judgement as well as perception[40]—but perception remains a necessary part of the procedure for settling many questions. This holds good, moreover, for the next portion of the dialogue, where it is stated that perception is a necessary condition for knowledge of various empirical matters (201 b) and in some cases even for mistaken judgements about them (193 a–194 b). That being so, perception will often be serving as an indispensable aid to some inquiry initiated by the soul, and in this quite respectable sense can be considered active, not something that *simply* happens to the mind. The spatial metaphor may be of assistance here, since it admits of both active and passive readings. On the one hand, the soul can be pictured as gaining access to things through (the apertures of) the senses, while this same process viewed from the world outside can be seen causally in terms of physical stimuli passing through the body to impinge upon the mind. So far as the *Theaetetus* is concerned, whatever may be true of the *Philebus* or the *Timaeus*, it endorses both viewpoints without deciding between them, and no argument in the passage turns on which we choose. Once again, no more than a picture is involved.

IV

What is important is the way the spatial metaphor helps to emphasize that what the soul discovers in perception is external to and independent of ourselves and our bodies. This is a further significant contrast with the earlier treatment of perception, and one that has not been noticed by any commentator I am familiar

we perceive our own παθήματα, whether these are experiences (like πάθος at 161 d 4, 179 c 3) or bodily happenings (as the *Philebus*, and similarly *Tim.* 64 ab, lead me to suppose). *Timaeus* 64 b avoids this unwanted implication, but only by having the bodily processes which reach the mind 'announce' the character of the activating stimulus (ἐξαγγείλῃ τοῦ ποιήσαντος τὴν δύναμιν)—a metaphor which still contains the surreptitious appeal to some kind of awareness. The fact is, a philosopher who puts the mind at the terminus of a chain of physical processes is bound to be embarrassed by the problem of how the process is transmitted to the mind, and it is then tempting to cover up by reimporting the familiar notions of perception and awareness. There is a nice example in Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding* II.1.23, where he is arguing that there are no ideas in the mind before the senses convey them in by sensation. Having written, in *Philebus* style, 'sensation . . . is such an impression or motion made in some part of the body, as *makes it be taken notice of* in the understanding', in the fourth edition he crossed out the italicized phrase and substituted 'produces some perception', leaving it unclear what the perception is of or how it is produced.

[40] It can hardly be accidental that ἐστόν . . . ἢ οὔ occurs at 185 b 10 sandwiched in the middle of an argument designed to enforce the point that the application of the verb 'to be' or its negation (185 a 9: ἐστόν; 185 c 5–6: τὸ ἔστιν . . . καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι), even to something perceived, is an exercise of judgement. The argument will be set out in due course below.

with. The Heraclitean theory of perception was constructed to ensure that a colour like whiteness, for example, would not be a distinct thing either outside the eyes or in them, or anywhere else for that matter (153de). This result was secured by making whiteness one of the 'fast changes' postulated by the theory. It is a process which takes place between an eye and a momentary object and it consists simply in that object's being seen as, or appearing, white to the eye that sees it (156 ce). Much emphasis is placed on the point that what the eye sees is not whiteness but a white thing: what one perceives is a momentary object of a certain sort (156 e, 159 e–160 a, 160 c), and this is no more whiteness, say, than the eye which sees is seeing or sight (156 e, 159 e, 182 ab). Whiteness is not a thing in its own right but the appearance of a thing, the way in which a momentary stone, for example, affects an eye. And the same goes for sounds and smells and the other sensible qualities: although we may speak of them as things perceptible (*αἰσθητά*–156 bc, 182 b), really they are changes or processes which have no being of their own outside or apart from a particular perceptual encounter of the sort the theory describes.

Contrast with this our passage. One is still said, as before, to perceive white things and black, and again hot and hard and light and sweet things (184 de; cf. 184 b), but this soon gives way to talk of seeing colours and hearing sounds and perceiving the hardness of what is hard and the softness of what is soft (185 a, 186 b). And in this context Plato makes the important claim (repeated later at 186 b in connection with hardness and softness) that a colour and a sound each has being in its own right. Each of them is (185 a), which in the light of recent work on Plato's concept of being[41] I take to mean at least that there are values of F such that the colour or the sound is F. Certainly, it is not the 'is' of existence, since its negation 'is not' is later singled out as something that is also true of both the colour and the sound, indeed of everything (185c).[42] This is a stumbling-block to interpretations–there are quite a number–which take Plato to be distinguishing here between perceiving a colour and judging that it exists or is the real colour of something;[43] or again, between perceiving a colour and thought about what it (essentially) is.[44] The negative 'is not' best fits a simpler scheme designed to mark off perception of a colour or a sound from the thought that

[41] Michael Frede, *Prädikation und Existenzaussage: Platons Gebrauch von '. . . ist . . .' und '. . . ist nicht . . .' im Sophistes* (Göttingen 1967), G.E.L. Owen, 'Plato on Not-Being', in Gregory Vlastos (ed.), *Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology* (New York 1970); also Charles H. Kahn, 'The Greek Verb "To Be" and the Concept of Being', *Foundations of Language* ii (1966).

[42] I say 'singled out' because one could not argue that all the common features are common to all sensible qualities; although some pairs of opposites, e.g. likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, are like being and not being in that they are jointly exemplified by anything, others obviously compete for subjects to exemplify them, e.g. odd and even, and probably also good and bad.

[43] So, in various ways and with mutual disagreements, Cornford, op. cit., 105–6, Crombie, op. cit. ii.16 ff, Sayre, op. cit., 97–9, Cooper, op. cit. 141–4 (one of two interpretations between which he does not decide), Holland, op. cit., 107–8 (with hesitation). With this reading belongs also Russell's complaint concerning 'two millennia of muddle-headedness about "existence", beginning with Plato's *Theaetetus*', in his *History of Western Philosophy* (London 1946), 860 with 176–7.

[44] Jason Xenakis, 'Essence, Being and Fact in Plato: An Analysis of One of Theaetetus "Koina" ', *Kant-Studien* 49 (1957–8), 170–7, translates *ἐστόν* here and at 186 b 6 by 'exists' but holds that 'essence' is a good interpretation (one of three) for *οὐσία* in 186 ad. On the other hand, McDowell, op. cit., 187, 190–2, appears (after some hesitation) to favour a reading 'each of them is *what it is*', where an example would be the proposition 'the colour is white'. I agree that identificatory judgements of this sort come into play in the argument of 186 a ff, but there is no sign as yet, or indeed later, that the *meaning* of 'is' is so narrowly conceived.

each of them is, and again is not, various things;[45] or perhaps better, each of them is and is not because they are and are not various things.[46]

This reading of the passage may be further supported by a brief consideration of the final argument against the thesis that knowledge is perception. The thesis fails, according to that argument, because perception does not grasp being, but no one can attain truth or, consequently, have knowledge, unless he grasps being (186 cd). No defence is offered of the idea that knowledge, let alone truth, presupposes a grasp of being in the specific sense of existence, reality or essence, and if any such narrow notion of being were intended, the argument would be left to limp on an unargued assumption of the first magnitude. That is not Plato's manner in this dialogue. If, on the other hand, the notion of being at work in the final argument is the quite general one which abstracts from the 'is' in propositions of the form '*x* is *F*', then in appealing to the point that a grasp of being is a necessary condition for attaining truth or knowledge Socrates is bringing to bear an agreement which has governed the discussion since 152 c. Any candidate for knowledge must be something that gives reliable access to what is; and it is clear from the context at 152 c that 'what is' (likewise the corresponding 'being' of 160 c) represents, quite generally, what is so and so.[47]

Moreover, when Plato begins the second part of the dialogue, it is clear to him that his earlier contrast between perception and the mind's independent activity with respect to common features like being is in fact a distinction between perception as such, on the one hand, and judgement, whether true or false, on the other. This is firmly stated at 187 ab. We thus have it on Plato's own authority that the crucial limitation on perception is that it does not, considered on its own, contain a power of judgement. The inability of perception to grasp being stems from an inability to frame even the simplest proposition of the form '*x* is *F*'. That knowledge presupposes a true judgement involving predication, and with it an explicit or implicit use of the verb 'to be', is obvious enough not to need separate defence, and, as we have noticed, it has in any case been a guiding principle of the discussion all along. What needs to be proved before the final refutation can get going is that perception is not capable of any such judgement. It is this proof that Socrates is preparing when he speaks of the being of colours and sounds. Hence it must be the same broad notion of being which is at work both at 185 a and later at 186 c.

To resume, then: the colour and the sound both are and are not, since they are and are not various things. Examples are forthcoming immediately (185 ab). Each of them is different from (i.e. is not) the other and is the same as itself, each is one, so that together they are two, possibly also we can discover respects in which they are similar or dissimilar (not similar).[48] These are highly formal

[45] This interpretation, although less common, is at least as old as Paul Natorp, *Über Platos Ideenlehre* (Philosophische Vorträge veröffentlicht von der Kantgesellschaft Nr. 5, Berlin 1914), 10–15. It is also one of the alternatives entertained by Xenakis, op. cit., 177, and Cooper, op. cit., 140–1.

[46] The advantage of treating '*x* is (not)' as a detachable (though still incomplete) constituent of '*x* is (not) *F*' (on which cf. Owen, op. cit., esp. 255) is that it reflects the detached presentation of the thought that the colour and the sound both are (note the καί at 185 a 11, although πρῶτον μέν at 185 a 8 may look further forward to ἔτι δέ at 185 b 9 or ἡ δὲ δή at 185 c 4).

[47] Here I am indebted to Winifred Hicken.

[48] It is a question whether this last is a possible line of thought (185 b 4–5), a question Theaetetus is not sure should be answered in the affirmative (translating his reply (195 b 6: ἴσως) 'Perhaps' with Hackforth, op. cit., 134, and Diès rather than Cornford's 'No doubt' or McDowell's 'I

predicates, chosen to suit the argument of the moment (though to bring the discussion down to earth we might try thinking of the experience of sights and sounds together at a ballet),[49] but their application to sensible qualities holds out the promise that a colour or a sound will have its own definite nature, something that can be investigated apart from any particular perceptual encounter with it. (It is relevant to mention here the use which the third part of the dialogue makes of the classification and analysis of sounds, both verbal (203 ab) and musical (206 ab), as a model for the role of *logos*, in the sense of a definition or analytical account of something, in the acquisition of knowledge.) And to say, as Plato says both here and in the *Cratylus* (423 e), that colours and sounds have being or a definite nature in their own right is to affirm what the Heraclitean theory denies, that they are distinct things outside the eyes and ears of the perceiver, independent of him and his body. That being so, it is altogether appropriate to picture the perceiver's relation to them, through eyes and ears, in terms of a spatial metaphor.

Let me pause here to review the results of this discussion so far. I have tried to set out the conception of the unified perceiving consciousness which Plato is advancing. The soul has its own nature and identity apart from particular perceptions, and so too do the sensible qualities it encounters in perception. Subject and object meet not through a pair of transitory motions, as on the Heraclitean theory, but through the body and its organs. Perception is not just something that happens to eyes and ears: the soul may take the initiative, use the senses as equipment provided by the body as an essential aid to discovering, e.g. whether two things both have a salty taste, and generally investigate the sensible qualities of things. This, I submit, is the conception Plato is recommending. If it seems unabashedly commonsensical, even truistic, it must be seen in its full context in counterpoint to the Heraclitean theory of the earlier discussion and the unpalatable commitment of that philosophy to doing away with personal identity on the one hand and an objective world on the other. After the exploration and refutation of the extreme empiricist tendencies which Plato takes the definition of knowledge as perception to represent, there is plenty of reason to sketch a more reassuring picture, one that is in closer touch with everyday beliefs and more in keeping with the language an attentive speaker might use.

V

So much for the picture. Plato's argument for it is the argument of 184 e–185 e, from which I have already extracted some important statements about the objectivity of sensible qualities. I would now like to run through the argument itself to see how it establishes the conception of a unified perceiving consciousness. One is apt to miss the full force of the considerations that support this conception owing to the fact that the conclusion of the argument, as it stands

suppose so'). The point, presumably, is that with similarity at any rate it is a good deal less obvious than with the previously mentioned features what one would be asking if one inquired whether it was common to a colour and a sound; not that respects of similarity could not be found, whether superficial (e.g. both are things perceived) or deep (Hackforth refers to the possibility of treating both colour and sound in the manner of the *Philebus* as indefinite continua susceptible of particular determinations).

[49] A suggestion made in this connection by William Kneale in a lecture *On Having a Mind* (Cambridge 1962), 18–19.

at the end (185 e 6–7), is simply that the soul investigates some things through itself,[50] others through the power of the body. This, however, seems to underdescribe both the original aim of the reasoning and its achievement. The initial impetus of the argument came from Socrates' indicating at 184 d that he wanted to be able to say that it is with some one and the same part of ourselves that we do all our perceiving. It looked for a moment as if he was going himself to give some justification for the unity thesis, but he broke off, saying that Theaetetus should not have all his work done for him (184 e); then began the series of questions which, with the aid of some sterling contributions from Theaetetus as respondent (cf. Socrates' praise of him at 185 de), lead up to the rather modest-sounding conclusion of 185 e. That conclusion may imply, but it does not emphasize, the unity of the perceiving consciousness.[51] But a confirmation, if not an explicit proof, of the unity thesis is implicit in something the argument does emphasize, that the soul can think and reason about whatever we perceive. For the soul's consciousness of things perceived would be unintelligible if it was not this same soul that perceived them but another subject or subjects.

The official premiss of the argument is that what is perceived through one sense, e.g. sight, cannot also be perceived through another, such as hearing (184 e–185 a)– a very strong assertion with a decidedly empiricist ring about it. Something like this claim was indeed part of the Heraclitean theory of perception (cf. 156 bc), which insisted on the non-identity of the wine tasted and the wine seen. Sweetness being the sole (perceptible) feature of the former, whiteness the only mode in which the latter could appear, there was neither an object to possess nor a subject to perceive the two qualities in common. In developing this theory Socrates maintained a noticeable silence about shape, which, as an object of both sight and touch, is perhaps the most obvious counter-example to the thesis that what is perceived through one sense cannot also be perceived through any other.[52] But Plato supplies his own counter-example in the next section of the dialogue, where he talks freely of seeing, touching, and hearing Theodorus and Theaetetus and contrasts this perceiving a person with judging who it is that one perceives (192 d; cf. 193 a, 194 a, 195 d, e, 201 b). Moreover, Plato does not share, indeed he is arguing against, one line of thought that has motivated empiricist philosophers to confine each sense to its own proper objects: the idea, namely, that these objects are peculiarly self-intimating, that we have only to sense them to know them immediately for what they are, with a certainty enabling us to use them as foundations for the interpretations and inferences which constitute the bulk of our perceptual beliefs. So it is a question whether the doctrine that each sense is confined to its own proper objects is something that Plato accepts in his own person or is a hangover from the em-

[50] δι' αὐτῆς should be understood, as often, negatively: 'not through anything else' (cf. *Prot.* 347 cd, *Phd.* 82 e) = καθ' αὐτήν (186 a 4) = ἐν ἑαυτῇ (186 a 10); McDowell, op. cit., 188, agrees.

[51] Alone among the commentators, McDowell, op. cit., 186, notices that we are led to expect an argument for the unity thesis. He agrees that the thesis itself is implied at 185 e and his outline of the argument for it (op. cit., 189) is akin to the view to be developed here.

[52] There is one mention of seeing not only colour but shape too, at 163 b, but this is in a critical section, not in the exposition of the theory, and the example in question concerns the shape of written letters, which (if written in ink on a smooth material rather than inscribed in wax, sand, etc.) one would not necessarily be able to feel as well as see. Another counter-example, size, receives prominent mention early on at 154 b, but it is taken over into the illustrative model for the theory set out in the puzzle passage 154 c–155 d and does not reappear.

piricist way of thinking which is his target, to be discarded when the thesis that knowledge is perception is finally refuted.

This question I shall not try to answer here. All the argument actually uses is a weaker principle which Plato, and possibly we ourselves, could well endorse, namely: through sight one is aware of colours but not sounds, through hearing sounds but not colours, and so on. In other words, each sense has its own proper objects, which are inaccessible to the remaining senses, leaving it open whether a given sense is *confined* to these objects. Nothing in the argument turns on excluding the possibility of seeing Theaetetus, as distinct from, or in addition to, seeing a certain colour or colours.[53] What matters is that one does not through sight have access to sounds or the features of sounds, nor through hearing to colours and features of colours.[54]

Suppose, then, we are aware, as can happen, of a feature common to a colour seen and a sound heard.[55] For instance, we think to ourselves that here are two things, each of them one, the same as itself and different from the other, and we consider in what ways they are similar or dissimilar (185 ab). It follows even from the weaker principle that it cannot be through either sight or hearing that we are aware of these features. Some third mode of apprehension must be involved (185 b).

Here Socrates pauses to present a further piece of evidence for the conclusion just reached (so he explains at 185 b 9), evidence which in fact functions partly to forestall a possible objection,[56] and partly to illustrate the conclusion itself. If, *per impossibile*,[57] we were investigating whether a colour and a sound were both salty, it would not be either sight or hearing that we would use but some-

[53] For this reason, among others, it is important that αἰσθάνεσθαι be translated 'perceive' throughout, not 'have a sensation'.

[54] A thesis close to this is defended by Holland, op. cit., 105–7. No doubt Plato took it to be a rather obvious truth. It had been used before him, for polemical purposes of a very different character, by Gorgias *apud* [Ar.] *MXG* 980 b 1 ff, Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 7.83 ff, where Gorgias in turn is borrowing from Empedocles (cf. Theoph. *De sens.* 7). But there are difficulties, e.g. some people claim to be able to discriminate colours by feeling. For a discussion of philosophical issues in this area, cf. H. P. Grice, 'Some Remarks About the Senses', in R. J. Butler (ed.), *Analytical Philosophy* (Oxford 1962); Richard Sorabji, 'Aristotle on Demarcating the Five Senses', *Phil. Rev.* 80 (1971).

[55] Questions are sometimes raised as to the metaphysical status of these items. Sayre, op. cit., 98, maintains, without argument, that they are the qualities colour and sound as such, not particular instances of qualities like the particular whites and blacks which are the objects of particular perceptions. McDowell, op. cit., 111, 187, considers a different choice: colour and sound *versus* particular colours and sounds like white and middle C (not instances of these); his translation gives the second, Cornford's the first. Holland, op. cit., 104 argues that particular perceived colours and sounds alone are relevant to the discussion, not the abstract qualities, but he does not explain whether by 'particular' he means particular qualities or instances thereof. It will be obvious that I tend to the first of these. Particular sensible qualities are what Plato has in mind both here and later when he speaks of the hardness of what is hard and the softness of what is soft (186 b). That said, however, it is pertinent to go on to query the assumption, which Plato shares with his commentators and many others, that colours and sounds are on the same level, so that the only difficulty is to know whether it is as qualities or as individuals that they qualify as the proper objects of sight and hearing respectively. In fact, it is arguable that while colours are qualities, sounds are spatio-temporal individuals; cf. J. O. Urmson, 'The Objects of the Five Senses', *Proc. Brit. Acad.* 54 (1968), for salutary remarks on this and related issues.

[56] As noted by McDowell, op. cit., 187–8.

[57] For '*per impossibile*' cf. 185 b 9–10: 'if it were possible to investigate, etc.', clearly implying that it is not, as indeed it is not.

thing else, our sense of taste operating through the tongue. This shows both how a third mode of apprehension is needed for a feature common to the proper objects of different senses (the illustrative function), and that this third mode can be a perceptual one only if there is a sense or sense organ giving access to the feature in question.[58] Since no organ or sense can be pointed out as the means of access to common features like being, identity, similarity or dissimilarity, it is legitimate to conclude that these features, and others like them, are not apprehended through perception at all (185 cd). Such features are not only common to everything, and so *a fortiori* to colours and sounds,[59] but not themselves perceptible. As a later philosopher might put it, there is no such thing as an impression of being or of sameness or, to add one more disagreement with Heraclitean empiricism, of good and bad (186 a with 157 d). Hence it must be the soul on its own, acting independently of the body and its sense organs, which considers these aspects of what one perceives (185 e).

This suffices for the argument's official conclusion, but one more easy step will take us to Socrates' original statement that it is with one and the same part of ourselves that we do all our perceiving: although the common features are non-perceptible, a soul that is aware of their belonging to perceptible things like colours and sounds must also be percipient, and since they are common to the objects of different senses, it must be one and the same perceiving subject which is aware of all the objects that have them in common. In other words, what shows there is just one element in us that does all our perceiving is precisely that there is something in us, the soul, which can think and reason about whatever we perceive.

This argument is remarkable for the way it combines thought and perception in a single unitary subject—remarkable, that is, when one recalls the treatment of sense perception in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* as something essentially alien to the soul, or to the soul's true nature. Problems remain about the exact interpretation of the two functions thus combined—more problems than I can deal with here—but these should not be allowed to obscure Plato's achievement in arriving at the first unambiguous statement in the history of philosophy of the difficult but undoubtedly important idea of the unity of consciousness.

The word 'consciousness' is not, of course, one for which Plato has at his disposal even a remotely corresponding equivalent. But my use of the term to interpret Plato is not, I hope, entirely anachronistic.[60] We have taken Plato's own word for it that the contrast between perception and the mind's independent activity is a distinction between perception as such, on the one hand, and all judgement, true or false, on the other; the inability of perception to grasp being stems, we said, from an inability to frame even the simplest proposition of the form '*x* is *F*'. In his final proof that perception is not knowledge Plato is interested in the perfectly general point that a true judgement involving the verb 'to be' is a necessary condition for knowledge (186 c), but if we focus, as Plato does

[58] The disjunction 'sense or sense organ' is not redundant because in the case of touch there is a sense, called ἐπαφή (186 b), but no localized organ (cf. *Tim.* 64 a, 65 b and Sorabji, op. cit., 68 ff).

[59] '*A fortiori*' is suggested by the word order τό τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις (185 c 4–5). The possibility of understanding the phrase this way is an adequate answer to the proposal of Hackforth, op. cit., 135, to transpose πᾶσι and τούτοις for the sake of a more natural word order.

[60] It did not seem so to Natorp, op. cit., 14–16, who used the notion to much the same purpose as guides me here.

earlier, on judgements specifically about sensible qualities, the thesis amounts to this, that the identification and description of what we perceive cannot be accounted for by the exercise of our sense faculties, whether singly or together. Sense alone gives us no idea, not even, as in the *Republic*, a false or confused idea, of what it is we are seeing or hearing; for that judgement is required. This, I submit, is quite reasonably paraphrased as a claim that to perceive something is not, as such, to be aware or conscious of it as being anything in particular.

Such a thesis raises at least as many problems as it solves. How, for example, is perception to be characterized positively if all judgemental factors are abstracted from it? Plato does not say, but the subsequent history of philosophy shows both how powerful is the temptation to separate off judgement from perception and how difficult it is to specify intelligibly what then remains. What remains, on Plato's account, is a transaction of a determinate kind between the perceiver and certain items 'out there' in his environment, but it is a question whether the transaction could be characterized in sufficient detail to be recognized as perception without bringing in some trace of awareness, consciousness, or judgement—the very things Plato wants to contrast with perception. But that difficulty, serious though it is, should not detract from Plato's achievement. He not only set the problem for the first time, but in connecting it with a notion of the unity of a single thinking and perceiving subject he was looking in the right direction for a solution.

For surely, to revert to the passage from Russell I quoted earlier, if the something or somebody which sees a brown colour really has no past or future, and no other experiences (contemporaneous or at other times) to compare and contrast with this one isolated perception, it can no more be said to be conscious of the brown colour than can a torch lighting up a brown surface or a mirror reflecting it. To be aware of a brown colour is at least to have discriminated it from some background, which at once opens a way in for operations like comparing and contrasting, counting and distinguishing, in terms of which Plato discusses the soul's thinking about its perceptions; and more complex cases will involve the role of factors like memory and past learning which Plato goes on to study in subsequent pages of the dialogue. To bring all these to bear on a particular perceptual encounter can only be the work of a central enduring mind with a unified consciousness that is capable of far more than the mere reception of isolated perceptions.[61]

That said, I have completed the task I set myself of showing how the grammatical claim on which Plato bases this important section of the dialogue enables him to spell out the idea of the unity of the perceiving consciousness. I shall close with one final, critical comment.

[61] If this conclusion brings to mind Kant's critique of empiricism, that is as it should be. At one time it was thought entirely acceptable to clothe the interpretation of this section of the *Theaetetus* in Kantian terminology; cf. e.g. Natorp, op. cit., J. A. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas* (Oxford 1909), 66–8, and for an extreme case, H. F. Carlill, *The Theaetetus and Philebus of Plato* (London-New York 1906), 58–61. The practice drew a sharp protest from Cornford, op. cit., 106, n. 2, with special reference to Campbell, op. cit., liii, and to the idea that Plato's common features resemble the categories of Kant. I am not claiming that they do. But when all the differences of time and doctrine between the two philosophers are acknowledged—and they are many and fundamental—certain common tendencies of great significance remain, which it is no disgrace to have responded to. Cf. also Cooper, op. cit., 144.

VI

Looking back to the 'with' idiom after our exploration of the discussion that grows out of its rejection, we may feel that while Plato's unified soul is no doubt an improvement on the plurality of perceivers it replaces, it is not a final solution. In terms of the model of the wooden horse, is it not true that all Plato has done is replace the band of warriors by a single warrior? He is a thoughtful one like Odysseus, to be sure, but his relation to the body and its organs in perception looks suspiciously contingent—in keeping, of course, with Plato's well-known dualism of soul and body. The spatial metaphor and the equipment model betray this. They picture the relation between mind and body in perception in terms which encourage, or at least allow, one to think of a merely causal connection, as if the necessity of perceiving through a body and its organs were comparable to the necessity of looking through a door or window to see out of a house or the necessity of using a hammer to bang in a nail.

It may be replied that Plato could still, compatibly with everything he says, include a reference to (some part of) the body in the definition of each sense. In that case it would be logically necessary that seeing involves eyes, hearing ears, and so on, and it would not count as perception unless some bodily process was included. This would seem close, in fact, to Plato's actual position in the *Timaeus* and *Philebus*, not to mention the argument of *Theaetetus* 185 be as interpreted above.[62] But it is not, I think, quite enough. For it is equally a logical or analytic necessity that one use a hammer to hammer with—otherwise it does not count as hammering. Surely I am more intimately related to my eyes in seeing than to my hammer in hammering. It was left to Aristotle to bring the horse itself alive with the power of perception.

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[62] Here I am indebted to Gregory Vlastos.